In this paper, we investigate a search-and-hide game played by a searcher and a mobile target with a conditionally deterministic motion. The target space consists of discrete cells and there are possible targets's paths which specify the target's position (cell number) at all times in future. The target selects one of pat,hs at t,he beginning of the game and moves along the path t,hereaft,er. The searcher knows all possible paths of the target but he cannot know which path is selected by the target. The searcher is restricted by his total searching effort at each time, and allocating it among cells, he searches the target. We formulate this search situation as a two-person zero-sum game and derive the optimal solution. Several examples are examined a,nd t8he meaning of the optimal conditions are elucidated.
Introduction
Tn this paper, we deal with a two-sided search game played by a searcher and a mobile target with a rather simple type of motion called the conditionally deterministic motion (abbreviated as CDM, hereafter). The CDM target was dealt with by Stone [5,61 first in his study of the optimal distribution of searching effort in the one-sided search. The CDM target is defined generally as a moving target whose motion takes place in Eucl idean space and depends on an stochast ic parameter such as the target's velocity and so on. If this parameter were known, then the target's position would be known at all times in future. However, the CDM target dealt with in this paper is more restrictive than the general one in a sense that the stochastic parameters are defined by target's paths on the target space. The target space consists of discrete m cells and the time space also does discrete n time points. A path a> of the target is defined as a sequence of cell numbers which specifies the target's position at each time. Set of possible paths of the target is known to the searcher. The target selects one of paths at the beginning of the game and moves along the path thereafter. On the other hand, a searcher is restricted by his available total searching effort at each time, and allocating it among cells, he searches cells for the target. Here, we assume that the searcher wants to detect the target and the target does not. In this paper, we formulate this search situation as a two-person zero-sum game and derive optimal strategies.
The two-sided search for a mobile target such as the well known problem of "the princess and monster game" posed by Isaacs and Its variations, the search games on a graph or tree, the ambush search games and so on, have been investigated by many authors [l1 and some results of them were compiled and pub1 ished by Gal RI. However, we cannot find any paper which gives the solution of the rather simple game dealt with here. As shown later, the payoff function of our game is presented by a strictly convex function of the searcher' s strategy for every target' s strategies. Hence, f i-om the viewpoint of theoretical study of the game theory, the existence of the optimal solution and its properties have been known. However, from the standpoint of the twosided search problems, our knowledge is very l it t le. Fur thermore, since the target' s movement may be restricted in several paths and the set of possible paths is known by the searcher in many cases of actual search, our game may be valuable to analyze and be useful for practical applications.
In the next section, system parameters are defined and assumptions of the model are described in detail. In S 3, the problem is formulated and the optimal solution is presented. Several generalizations of our model are analyzed in S4 and numerical examples are examined in S 5. Finally in S 6, the implications of the optima! conditions and the results obtained here are discussed.
Assumptions of the Model
The definition of the system parameters and the assumptions of the model are presented as follows.
(l). The target space consists of m discrete cells j = 1.2.---,m, and the target's movement and the search take place at discrete time points t = l,2, --, n.
(2). The target' s path is defined as a sequence of cell numbers co = { j(0, t =l, 2, --, n} where j ( t ) is the cell in which the target exists at time t. The path is permitted to stay on the same cell, to skip the cells, and to appear or vanish from the target space. The number K of the possible paths is assumed to be finite. (3). The target selects one of K paths at the beginning of the game so as to avoid detection by the searcher and moves along the path thereafter. Let TiCco) be the cell of the target selecting the path co at time t. In each time t, first the target moves to cell L (co) from Li (W), and then the searcher searches cells for the target. We assume that if the target is not found in the time interval [l,n], he gains a score 1 from the searcher, and if he is detected, he gives a score 1 to the searcher. (4). Total searching effort {C( t), t =l, 2, ---, n} is available to the searcher, and the effort C(t) is assumed to be continuously divisible in allocating it among cells. The searching effort a1 located to cell j at time t is denoted by d> (j, f). (5) . If the target exists in cell j at tine t, the conditional probability of detecting the target with unit searching effort is assumed to be a 0') 0 0) irrespective of the history of the past search. This assumption implies that the random search is conducted in each cell and the non-detection probability of the target with the searching effort 6 (j, f) is given by
which is called as the exponential detection function.
(6). The parameters: {C( t) 1. { a O) 1 and { co } are assumed to be known to both players in advance of the game. (7). The target' S payoff is defined by his score. Here, we assume that both the target and the searcher are opposing against each other completely in a sense that the target desires to maximize his score and the searcher wants to minimize it. The omniscient rationality of both players is assumed.
effort : <t> = {(P (j, t) 1 , where constraints : S , (b (j, t) 5 C(t) for a l l t and (& ( j t) 2 0 for a1 l j and t, are imposed on Q.
Let g ( u , Q ) be the conditional non-detection probability of the target in the game when the strategies a) and <^ are employed by both players. W e have ~( c D ,
(2) Then, the expected score of the target i s given by { 2 g ( u , <!>)-l} and in t h i s value, the factor (2) in the f i r s t term and the second term (-1) have not any effect on the optimization of the game. Therefore, we can define the payoff function of our game (the conditional expected score of the target) by do), Q ) . Since g ( @ , Q ) i s the exponential function of {(b (i, I)} for any CD by Eq. (2), the next lemma i s obvious. Lemma 1. g(w,^>) i s s t r i c t l y convex in Q f o r any CD.
Ll
Since our search game i s a s t r i c t l y convex game by Lemma 1, there e x i s t s a unique optimal solution. Here, we quote the basic theorem of the s t r i c t l y convex game from a text book [71 without proof. Lemma 2. In a s t r i c t l y convex game, the minimizer (the searcher) possesses a unique optimal strategy; moreover, this strategy is pure.
D
We define the mixed strategy of the target by P = {pu,, &)=l, 2, --,K}, where pc, i s the probability that the target selects path a). The expected payoff G(P, Q ) of the target i s given by
Therefore, our problem i s formulated a s the game t o obtain the optimal strategy ( P * <^ *) and the value of the game G satisfying subject to constraints:
S , @ ( j , t) 2 C O ) for a l l t and @ ( j , t) 2 0 for a l l t and j,
S o p u = 1 and p. 2 0 for a l l CD.
3.2. Optimal solution of the game Let P* = { p u * } and <I>* = { @ * ( L t)] be the optimal strategies of the target and the searcher, respectively. The optimal solution of our game i s presented by the next theorem. Theorem 1. Under the cons t-rain t (4), we define by Then, the optimal strategy {pw* of the target is given by
f o r a l l CD and Eq. (5) . On the o t h e r hand, the optimal s t r a t e g y { @ * (j, t) } of the searcher is given by &. (4) and f o r a l l t and j, where Q ( j , t) is the s e t of the t a r g e t ' s path such that Q ( j , t) = C D T t ( @ ) = j } , and A i s a non-negative Lagrange multiplier.
The value of the game is given by G = 1. 1 0. Proof. As is well known in the game theory, P* = {pu*} and Q * = {(f^(j,t)\ are optimal if and only if G(?, a * ? 5 G 5 GP*, G) for any P and Q. 9) is easily confirmed by substituting Eq. (7) into Eq. (3).
The second inequality of Eq. (10): G 2 G(?*, G) is the same problem that min+ G(P*,@) 2 G subject to Eq.(4). As easily seen from E Q . (~) , G(P\Q) is strictly convex in <I> and the constraint is a l inear function from Eq. (4). Therefore, the necessary and sufficient condition for mina G(?*, <!>) is obtained from the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem as :
for a Lagrange multiplier A ( 2 0) with A t(C(t)-Zj@(j,
is calculated from Eq. (3). Substituting it and Eq. (7) into the above equation ( The searcher's optimal strategy {(f)"(j, t ) } and no are obtained from Eqs. subject to the constraints (4). Since the problem given by the above equations can be converted to a linear programming problem, we can solve it by using the simplex method easily. Then, the optimal strategy {po)*} of the target is obtained from Eq. (8) and the value of the game is given by tin.
Generalization of the Model
In this section, we discuss several generalization of our game. 4.1. The model with the regular detection function
In the model described in the previous sect ion, we assume an exponential detection function given by Eq. (l). Without any difficulty, Theorem 1 can be generalized to more general detection function fU, (b (j, t)) so called the regular detection function having the next properties.
f
for all j . The above properties mean that the searching effort is subject to the law of diminishing marginal return. Furthermore, we assume that the detection in any j and t i s independent. In t h i s case, the payoff g and the expected payoff G of the target are given by
instead of EQS. (2) and ( 3 ) , respectively. In t h i s case, g e n e r a l l y the payoff g given by Eq. (13) i s not convex any more, except f o r the special f such a s the exponential detect ion function. And therefore, the game i s not the convex game. However, we can prove that the search game has an optimal strategy (P*, Q *) given by the next theorem. Theorem 2. The optimal solution of the game with the regular detection function i s stated as follows. Under the constraint (4). we define sin by Then, the optimal strategy {po*} of the target is given by Eq. (5) and for all a). The optimal strategy { 4) * ( j, 0 } of the searcher is given by Eq. (4) and
for all t and j, where f 9 ( j , 4 ) i s the derivative f with respect to d>, and A , is a non-nega t ive Lagrange mult ip l i er. The va l ue of the w e i s gi ven by G = 110. 
(a. e. d. )
By s e t t i n g f( j, 4>) = exp (-a ( j ) 4 ( j , t ) ? , we can e a s i l y derive Theorem 1 from Theorem 2. 4 .2. The model with generalized searching effort constraints I n Theorem 1, we consider the problem in which the t o t a l searching e f f o r t available to the searcher i s l imi ted by C( 0 in each time t, t = l, 2, --S , n. However, in search problems for a moving target, generally the next three types of constraints for the searching effort can be considered.
V i : (b ( j , t) 2 B ( j t) for a l l t and j.
Condition V i i s the constraint of the effort in c e l l j a t time t and Condition !F2 i s the constraint of the effort applied to the whole search space a t t, and Condition is the constraint of the total searching effort during the search. Proof. Since the strictly convexity of g in ^> for all CD is not affected by the constraints 1 , and Y 3, our game is still the convex game and Theorem is proved by similar manner to Theorem 1. However, since the Lagrangian function is defined including three constraints Y l, % and V 3, the right-hand side of Eq. 
Numerical Examples
In this section, to see the properties of the solution of the search game, several numerical examples are analyzed varying the searching effort constraint.
Case 2. Case 2 is s e t by interchanging the t o t a l searching e f f o r t C(t) ' S a t t = 1 and 2 in Case 1, namely, C(l) = 0.3, C(2) = 0.9, C(3) = 0.6. Since the target' S paths have many intersect ion i n order of t = 2,3,1, and therefore, the sequence of C(t) is reasonable in t h i s case. Other parameters remain the same a s Case 1. Table 2 shows an optimal solution of Case 2. In t h i s case, the LP problem given by Eqs. (4) and (6) has the optimal value no = 0.407 and the searching e f f o r t is concentrated t o a c e l l a t each time, and the e f f o r t t o each t a r g e t ' s path is not balanced : 0.9 f o r CO 1 . 2 f o r CD 2 , 1.5 f o r CO 3 and 0 . 9 f o r CO 4, where 0.407 = exp(-0.9). Therefore, the target should not select and cos. In Case 2, the LP problem has another extremal point a s the optimal solution with the same value /L = 0.407 a s shown in Table 3 . In Table 3 Tables 2 and 3 are also optimal, and since the searching e f f o r t t o co2 and i s larger than 0.9 in t h i s case, the target should not select and too. I t should be noted that the value of the game G (the non-detection probability of the t a r g e t ) of Case 2 decreases compare with the value of Case 1, i n s p i t e of the total searching e f f o r t during the search being constant 1.8. The reason is that since the target' S paths a t t = 2 has more intersections than that a t 1 = 1, the increase of e f f o r t a t t = 2 brings on the decrease of the non-detect ion probability of the target. I t suggests the optimal distribution of {at)}. Case 3. Case 3 is an example of Theorem 3. In this case, we consider a game with constraints : M^, V 2 , V 3 ) . Suppose that the searching effort is not limited in each cell ( Y 1 = a), the total searching effort at each time is constrained by ?F2 : { C(1) =O. 9, C(2) =O. 3, C(3) =O. 61 (same as Case l), and furthermore, the total searching effort during the search is limited by T : D = 1. b. Since Y 3 is severer than ?F2 ( S tC(t) = l . @ , the searcher cannot exhaust all C(t). The other parameters of the game are assumed to be the same as Case 1. The optimal solution of this case is obtained as Table 4 . In this table, the properties of <^ * ( j 0 stated about Case 1 are also seen, since the arrangement of C(t) is same as Case 1. However, since V.-?: D = a in Case 1, Case 3 is constrained by the total searching effort severer than Case 3 , and the effect appears on the value 1.1 a : n is increased from 0.427 in Case 1 to 0.472 in Case 3. It should be noted that the optimal distribution of total searching effort at each t under the constraints V 2 and Y.3 is (0.6, 0.3, 0.6) as shown in Table 4 . The searching effort at t = 1 is smaller than the limit CO). This result seems to be reasonable since the concentrat ion of the target' S paths is fewest at t = 1 as mentioned before. As for the optimal strategy {pi/] of the target, {pi.*} is not determined uniquely in this case, because Eqs. (8) and (5) has only three equations and two inequalities for four unknown po,*'s. It is interesting that the feature of pu* in Cases 1 and 2 is also seen in Case 3. Table 4 The optimal solution of Case 3
Discussions
In this section, we give the interpretation of the optimal conditions and discuss the results obtained in this paper and open problems to be studied in future.
Meaning of the optimal conditions
To consider the meaning of the optimal conditions, we examine Theorem 2. The interpretat ions of the conditions of Theorem 2 from the view point of the searcher are described as follows. First, we consider the meaning of Eqs. (15) and (16). The term ntf(Tt(o)), <& ( T t ( o ) ) , 0) in these equations is the conditional non-detection probabil ity of the target during the search given the target' S path U . Hence, Eqs. (15) and (16) mean that the searcher should allocate his searching effort so as to balance this non-detection probability as small as possible to , U 0 . By this allocation, the searcher does not give any advantageous path to the target. Secondly, to explain the meaning of Eq. (17). let P ( j , L a>) be the detect ion probability of the target selecting path o) in cell j at time t during the search. Then, we have the next equation. By using the above, Eq. (17) is rewritten as Since the term S w e o (,, t ) pw*3P(j, t, CO)/~(& (j, t) means the marginal detection probabil ity of the target at (j, t), Eq. (17) is described as follows. If the searcher searches cell j at time t, he should determine the searching effort so as to balance the marginal detection probability to A. among cells searched at t, and if the the marginal detection probability at <b ( j , t) = 0 is not larger than A i , cell j must not be searched at t. By the theorem of the optimal search in the one-sided search for a moving target given by Iida [31. this allocation maximizes the overall detection probabi l i ty of the target during the search.
On the other hand, from the viewpoint of the target, the optimal conditions of Theorem 2 are interpreted as follows. Eq.06) means that the target should not select the path having smaller non-detection probability than P O . Since these paths are dangerous for the target, this selection rule is reasonable. However, as stated above, the non-detection probabil i ty of the target on each path are minimized as small as possible by the searcher, the target does not have any preferable path. But by setting his path probability by Ea. (171, the target can avoid to give the searcher any efficient cell having the high marginal detection probability, and this strategy is effective for the target to maximize his payoff. The meaning of Theorem 2 mentioned above is completely valid to Theorems 1 and 3, too.
Discussions on the Results
(1). In our model, if each path is defined by the same cell : co = {Kt) = i for all tl, it implies that the target is stationary and then fpwl is the probability distribution of the target on the target space. Theorems 1, 2 and 3 are also valid for this case. In this case. Theorem 1 is completely identical with the optimal solution of the search-and-hide game studied by Nakai E41 for an immobile target. (2). In our model, the target's path is permitted in defect of terms in some time interval. Therefore, we can deal with the search game for the appearing and/or the disappearing target and Theorems 1, 2 and 3 are all valid for these cases. (3). As stated in Â 1, we limit our CDM target to the case in which the parameter of the target's motion is defined by his path on the search space. In this case, we need not transform the searching on the search space into the parameter space. Our model may be easily generalized to the general CDM target defined by Stone [6] and the similar theorems as derived here may be also obtained. However, as stated by Stone, to derive clear results, we must assume that the absolute value of the Jacobian of the transformation is factorable in the parameter factor and the time factor. This assumption may limit the applicability of the model to the complex actual search situations. Since our search model of the mobile target defined by path is not troubled by the transformat ion, we can apply Theorems to considerably complex cases such that the target' S paths having many cross points, the search for the appearing and/or the disappearing target, the case of time dependent constraints of the distribution of his searching effort. In this formulation, the kinematics of the searcher' S movement is neglected. However, for the vehicular searcher, we must consider searcher' S paths. Moreover, other general izat ions of the model with respect to the following factors must be investigated.
(a). The model with other criterion such as the expected risk or the cost, (b). ,he model of continuous target space, (c). the model of continuous time space, (d). the discrete searching effort case, (e) . the multi target case, (f). the mu1 t istage search game : the search-and-evasion game, etc. Some of the above are easy, however, most of them may be very difficult. They are problems to be investigated in future.
